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BACK FROM THE DEAD: HOW PRESIDENT REAGAN
SAVED THE INCOME TAX
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN*
Plato once observed that "when there is an income tax, the
just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount
of income." Today, the Congress is once again engaged in the
timeless effort to craft an equitable, broadly based federal in-
come tax without many of the "loopholes" that have spawned so
much taxpayer cynicism. In this Article, Professor Chirelstein
surveys the dramatic evolution of federal tax policy since Ronald
Reagan became President. He argues that the President-an in-
veterate critic of the progressive income tax-is now leading the
country through a tax policy crisis he helped to create. Professor
Chirelstein concludes that the historic tax reform legislation of
the 99th Congress should lay to rest the concept of a consump-
tion tax and reinvigorate the progressive income tax that is the
federal government's fiscal cornerstone.
P RESIDENT Reagan has been an outspoken and consistent
opponent of the progressive income tax throughout his politi-
cal career. His criticism of big government, his enthusiasm for indi-
vidual enterprise and initiative, and his anti-tax theme have been a
constant element of the President's appeal to voters. In a 1961
speech to the Orange County, California, Press Club, Ronald Rea-
gan commenting about the federal income tax system said:
Once we were told the income tax would never be greater than 2
per cent and that only from the rich. In our lifetime, this law has
grown from 31 to more than 440,000 words. We have received this
progressive tax direct from Karl Marx who designed it as the
prime essential of a socialist state ...
*Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B., 1950, University of California at Berke-
ley; J.D., 1953, University of Chicago.
An earlier version of this Article was presented as the Mason Ladd Memorial Lecture at
the Florida State University College of Law on March 6, 1986.
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There can be no moral justification of the progressive tax....
Proportionate taxation we would gladly accept on the theory that
those better able to pay should remove some of the burden from
those least able to pay. The Bible explains this in its instruction
on tithing. We are told that we should give the Lord one tenth
and if the Lord prospers us ten times as much, we should give ten
times as much. But under our progressive income tax, computing
Caesar's share is a little different.'
That was in 1961. In his television address on tax reform in May
1985, President Reagan said:
Death and taxes may be inevitable, but unjust taxes are not. The
first American Revolution was sparked by an unshakable convic-
tion: Taxation without representation is tyranny. Two centuries
later a second American Revolution for hope and opportunity is
gathering force again, a peaceful revolution but born of popular
resentment against a tax system that is unwise, unwanted and
unfair.
• . . So let's get started, let's change the tax code to make it
fairer, and change tax rates so they are lower.
• . . [Changed in the ways that I propose, the tax law] would
send one simple, straight-forward message to an entire nation:
America, go for it.'
Though nearly twenty-five years apart, these two excerpts are
quite consistent in content as well as in the choice of the exagger-
ated metaphor, "Go for it." This is fourth-down-short-yardage ad-
vice which a sensible coach always disregards unless the game is in
the final minutes and the situation is desperate. Could we really be
in that position today, so tyrannized by the income tax that any
desperate move is justified?
Rhetoric aside, there have indeed been major developments in
the tax field during the Reagan years. The purpose of this Article
is to trace these developments, more ili outline than detail. The
quoted speeches make it clear that the President detests the idea
of a progressive tax and prefers a flat, proportionate tax, the latter
being authorized by the Bible itself. Reagan also prefers lower
taxes to higher taxes, not only because he thinks that higher taxes
1. Reagan, Encroaching Control-Keep Government Poor and Remain Free, 27 VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 677 (July 28, 1961).
2. Reagan, Overhauling the Tax System-Fairness, Simplicity and Growth, 51 VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 514 (May 28, 1985).
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dampen incentives to work and save, but also because they fuel
undesirable government programs. The question to be answered is
where these views have led us. To be sure, the march of events in
this field is far from over. At this writing, the House and the Sen-
ate have passed major tax legislation3 for which the President is
largely responsible. There are approximately two years remaining
of his second term, and there is the question, admittedly specula-
tive, of how his successor might deal with the tax problems the
President will leave behind. For various reasons, however, we may
have reached and passed a sort of fever-crisis in the history of fed-
eral tax policy, and it is ironic that the man who led us through it
is one whose view of the system has always been entirely hostile.
In this Article, the author summarizes present discontents: What
is wrong with our structure as it stands? How did it reach its pre-
sent condition? Next, recent history in the tax field will be sur-
veyed: What reform alternatives lay before the President when he
took office in 1981? Which did he choose and how did his tax pro-
gram during his first years in office reflect his apparent ideals?
Lastly, current legislative proposals will be examined: How respon-
sive are these proposals to the system's faults, and what do they
seem to show about the President's final (if it really is his final)
resolution of policy issues in this field?
The observations made under these headings are more or less
provable and a matter of record, and in general, well-known to tax
specialists. On the other hand, taxation is not one of the natural
sciences. The main issues in the field-shall we have a progressive
income tax, and shall we have an income tax at all-are largely a
matter of personal political and ethical judgment. Disagreement is
both possible and inevitable. Indeed public controversy over tax
policy has been as heated during the past half-dozen years as at
any time in our history.
I. PRESENT DISCONTENTS
Many agree that the federal income tax has deteriorated to the
point where it can no longer be defended as a fair and efficient
system for generating revenue. The President has publicly, if not
3. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. H12,826 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1985).
The Senate has recently passed a different version of this tax bill. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 132 CONG. REC. S8,293 (daily ed. June 24, 1986). A conference committee will now be
appointed to reconcile the differences between the two versions. This Article should serve as
helpful background material on that legislation.
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very originally, described the present code as Swiss cheese, "big
holes no matter how you slice it."' He is of course quite right. Tax
preferences have grown phenomenally since World War II, and it is
not possible today to regard our national tax system as anything
but unfair and unequal in its application. The Internal Revenue
Code contains a multitude of special interest provisions. Some are
"industry specific" concessions to big businesses like extractive in-
dustries,5 defense contractors,6 and bank and insurance compa-
nies, 7 while others benefit investors and high-salaried individuals
through reduced tax rates on capital gains,8 and travel and en-
tertainment expense deductions for executives and professionals.9
The ideal of a comprehensive tax base-a tax on "all income from
whatever source derived" 10-now really applies only to middle-
and lower-income taxpayers who have few opportunities to exploit
the preferences which the Code affords to others.
All of this is too familiar to require more than a brief mention,
but it is important to explore the special problems presented by
tax shelters and tax arbitrage because these devices may represent
the proverbial last straw. Nothing has had a more damaging effect
on the attitude of ordinary taxpayers toward the tax system, and
rightly so, than the increasing resort of high-bracket taxpayers to
tax shelters and tax arbitrage. The two terms sound technical but
actually stand for two related devices that are quite simple. Taken
together, they generally permit people with high incomes to reduce
their federal tax burdens to the level of an ordinary working per-
son, if not below.
A tax shelter is an investment that is wholly or partially tax-
exempt. Municipal bonds are a familiar example. To reduce the
borrowing costs of states and cities, the tax law simply exempts the
interest on municipal bonds from federal income tax.1" Anyone
who might otherwise invest his savings in a fully taxable security,
such as a corporate bond or a bank certificate of deposit, can in-
stead shelter that investment income by switching to municipals.
4. Remarks of the President to Citizens of Oshkosh, Release from office of the Press
Secretary, White House, May 30, 1985, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Oshkosh Speech].
5. E.g., I.R.C. § 263(c) (1985).
6. See HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., REPORT ON THE TAX REFORM BILL OF 1985, H.R.
REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 620 (1985) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
7. I.R.C. § 291 (1985).
8. Id. § 1202.
9. Id. 99 162, 274.
10. Id. 9 61(a).
11. Id. 9 103(a).
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This advantage, however, is limited because the price of municipal
bonds, to a considerable degree, already reflects the tax exemption:
municipal bond yields are less than that of comparable taxable se-
curities precisely because of their exempt status. 12
Another major class of investment is commercial property and
residential real estate, which apparently offers significant opportu-
nities for tax shelter advantages not fully capitalized by the mar-
ket. Unlike municipal bond interest, rents received by real estate
investors are fully taxable. However, by permitting real estate own-
ers to depreciate their investments over much shorter periods than
the true economic lives of the structures themselves, quite a simi-
lar effect is achieved. 13 Accelerated depreciation enables the inves-
tor to defer the payment of current taxes to later years. This defer-
ral is equivalent to an interest-free loan from the government,
which is the same as exempting a substantial portion of the invest-
ment income from tax in the first place.1 4
As a result, the investor class, whether by reason of the tax
deferral permitted to real estate owners, or by reason of the capital
gain preference allowed to security speculators, pays tax at much
lower rates on investment income than do those who receive in-
come from personal services. From the standpoint of income tax
fairness, not the slightest justification can be offered.
The matter does not stop there however. With some restrictions,
the Code permits taxpayers who borrow money in order to invest
in tax-exempt assets, especially real estate, to deduct the interest
they pay to the lender from their other taxable income, including
salaries and fees. In effect, a fifty percent taxpayer now finds it
worthwhile to pay more interest to a lender than he expects to
earn on the investment he makes with the borrowed money. Thus,
if the investment yields seven percent tax-free, the investor will be
glad to pay interest at a rate of, say, ten percent for a loan. While
it appears that the investor is paying three percent more for the
money he borrows than he will earn on the related investment, the
fact is that the ten percent interest outlay, being deductible from
other taxable income, costs him only five percent after tax. Be-
cause the interest he receives is tax-free, he nets two percent from
an arrangement that otherwise makes no economic sense. Presum-
ably, the investor can continue this process until his taxable in-
12. Gordon & Malkiel, Corporation Finance, in How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
185 (H. Aaron & J. Pechman eds. 1981).
13. Steines, Income Tax Allowances for Cost Recovery, 40 TAx L. REV. 483 (1985).
14. Id.
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come has been reduced to very low levels. It is precisely this phe-
nomenon, sometimes called tax arbitrage, 5 that is going on today,
with the consequence that high-bracket people are avoiding tax
not only on investment income by putting their savings into tax-
exempt investments, but also on personal service income by engag-
ing in tax arbitrage. Stated bluntly, anyone who these days allows
his income to be taxed at the highest marginal rates is a fool. He
should be looking for debt-financed tax shelters to invest in. Not
surprisingly, a whole industry has sprung up and exists for the sole
purpose of locating such opportunities and making them available
for a fee.
Having pointed to all of these shortcomings in our present sys-
tem, crowned by the tax arbitrage device, everyone would probably
agree with the President in describing the income tax as porous.
There is some irony here. The Reagan administration is responsi-
ble, to a degree, for the tax shelter problems mentioned. Responsi-
bility to one side, however, the fact is that our venerable income
tax structure is virtually in a state of collapse. High-income tax-
payers can easily avoid the high rates that the law appears to im-
pose, and perhaps as a consequence the general taxpayer morale is
declining. Thus, many taxpayers are consciously underreporting
their income-cheating, apparently with little risk of detection by
an understaffed Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The rather humil-
iating proposal for a federal tax amnesty, in which tax evaders
would be given a one-time chance to pay their back taxes without
penalty, is an indication of how far away we are from the ideal of a
practical, working income tax.
II. REFORM PROPOSALS
The income tax system is in worse condition today than it was
before President Reagan took office, and some of the biggest holes
in the cheese have been made by the President or by those he ap-
pointed to the Treasury. This is certainly not to say, however, that
the President is solely, or even largely, responsible for the present
situation. The erosion began long ago, and has spread with only a
few periods of remission. In any case, there is as much (or more)
reason to blame Congress, particularly the members of the House
15. Gann, Neutral Taxation of Capital Income: An Achievable Goal?, 48 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 77, 116 (Aut. 1985); Warren, Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax
Arbitrage, 38 TAx LAW. 549 (1984-85).
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and Senate tax-writing committees, as there is to criticize the
Treasury or the President.
During the 1950's and 1960's, the remedies attempted by those
who feared that the tax structure was decaying were limited to
patchwork; efforts were occasionally made by Treasury officials to
persuade Congress to deal with egregious problems. On the whole,
it was a losing battle. Proposals for substantive change were usu-
ally defeated by lobbyists, and the enforcement powers of the IRS
diminished significantly.
The need for an overall solution to the problems of the income
tax system had become apparent to the Treasury Department dur-
ing the early and mid-1970's. In 1977, the Treasury produced
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform."6 Blueprints was largely the
work of economists rather than tax lawyers, and perhaps for that
reason it focused less on technical detail and interpretation and
more on large-scale policy than most prior studies in the field.
With this broader perspective, Blueprints set out two large-scale
proposals for improvement of our national tax structure which
helped considerably to clarify the issues.
A. Comprehensive Tax Base
One of the proposals made in Blueprints was for a broader in-
come tax base in exchange for a rate reduction. Within the limits
of administrative feasibility, the tax base would be expanded to
include all items of income from whatever source derived. With the
revenues thus gained, tax rates would be brought down to lower
levels benefiting most taxpayers. It was estimated that income sub-
ject to tax would be increased by one-third under a broadened base
definition, and that rates could consequently be reduced to a top
bracket of thirty-eight percent (from the present fifty percent)
without a loss of revenue.,!
A decision to adopt an all-inclusive definition of "income" does
not automatically resolve all issues of what to bring in and what to
leave out of the tax base. 18 Even so, a decision to eliminate prefer-
ences by taxing all measurable accretions to wealth without regard
16. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977). For other discus-
sions of standard tax reform proposals, see THE PROMISE OF TAX REFORM (J. Pechman ed.
1985) and H. AARON & H. GALPER, ASSESSING TAX REFORM (1985).
17. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 8 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as BLUEPRINTS].
18. B. BITTKER, C. GALVIN, R. MUSGRAVE & J. PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE TAX BASE? A
DEBATE (1953).
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to source, to disallow deductions which quite plainly relate to per-
sonal rather than business activities, and to eliminate tax shelter
and arbitrage activities, would go far to restore the integrity of the
income tax system. Moreover, it would satisfy the general craving
for structural equity and fairness.
The comprehensive tax base idea can easily stand by itself. How-
ever, rate reduction is almost always proposed as an accompanying
feature, and this in turn raises the highly charged question of
whether the rate structure that results should be progressive or
proportionate. The term "modified flat tax" has been used in con-
nection with many recent reform proposals, but since any schedule
with more than one rate is by definition progressive, the question
really is one of degree. In the end, the question of progressivity or
proportionality probably cannot be answered through logic or anal-
ysis. The argument for progressive and against proportionate taxa-
tion usually is made on "equal sacrifice" grounds. That is, each
additional dollar of income adds to one's sense of well-being, but
not as much as the dollar that preceded it. Arguably then, equal
sacrifice will be obtained only if wealthy people pay tax at a higher
percentage rate than poor people. The difficulty with this argu-
ment, it is said, is that it obligates one to make interpersonal util-
ity comparisons that are impossible to verify. To say that a rich
man gets less pleasure from additional income than a poor man
and to say at what rate the increase in the rich man's satisfaction
declines is not possible. Because such determinations cannot be
made, no justification can be made for any particular progressive
tax schedule or indeed the idea of progression in general. 19
Actually, the same critical argument can be made about propor-
tionate taxation. If we cannot verify interpersonal utility compari-
sons, then we cannot say that the wealthy do not value additional
income less than the poor, and there is no basis for asserting that a
proportionate scheme is as fair or fairer than a progressive scheme.
In short, the case for any rate schedule is uneasy because every
schedule, whether flat or progressive, necessarily implies that the
schedule-maker thinks it fairer than some other schedule, which in
turn means that he has made assumptions about how the wealthy
and the poor relate.2 0 The issue thus becomes entirely one of ethics
19. W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953) (dis-
cussing various justifications for the progressive tax system).
20. See C. GALVIN & B. BITTKER, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? 37
(1969).
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and politics. Logical analysis cuts neither way, adding to rather
than detracting from its importance.
B. Consumption Tax Base
The second alternative reform proposal in Blueprints was to
scrap the income tax entirely and substitute for it a national con-
sumption tax. This idea was not a new one. It can be traced back
to the great Yale economist Irving Fisher, who argued in the 1940's
that it was better to tax people on what they take out of the econ-
omy through consumption, rather than on what they put into the
economy through saving.2 '
The consumption tax idea can be summarized quickly. In effect,
the tax is imposed on consumption expenditures only; savings are
excluded from the tax base. 22 If, for example, an individual earns
$50,000 at his job this year, spends $40,000 on living expenses, and
invests $10,000 in the stock market, he will be taxed on $40,000
only-the $10,000 of savings is deducted. The same $10,000 will be
taxed if it is ever withdrawn and spent on consumption, possibly
during the individual's retirement, but as long as it remains in-
vested, no tax on that amount will be imposed. With a reduced
base, the tax rate under a consumption tax would have to be
higher than an income tax rate if the same revenue goals were to
be met.
Reserving the ultimate question of "fairness" for a moment, it
should be emphasized that a consumption tax would resolve and
simplify some of the besetting complexities of the income tax, es-
pecially those that relate to the treatment of income from capital.
Thus, there would be no further need to distinguish capital gains
from ordinary income, because it is not the source of the individ-
ual's' income but how he disposes of it that matters. In addition,
the vexatious question of asset depreciation would be entirely
avoided. A business would simply be taxed on gross receipts less all
expenditures, including purchases of plant and equipment, because
the difference necessarily represents consumption.2 3 In effect, plant
and equipment purchases would be deducted all at once rather
than being recovered though periodic depreciation allowances, as is
the case under an income tax. Tax shelters would presumably van-
21. I. FISHER & H. FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION: A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
(1942).
22. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 17, at 12.
23. Id. at 121-22.
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ish as a tax problem because income from capital investment
would be free of tax to start with, and sheltering would be unnec-
essary. Finally, the separate tax on corporate income would be re-
pealed. As long as a corporation retains and reinvests its earnings,
such earnings are obviously not available for individual consump-
tion. When dividends are paid a tax is imposed if the shareholder
expends the dividend on consumption, but not if he saves it, as by
reinvesting in additional corporate shares. In effect, we do not
worry about the source or amount of income. What we do care
about, and all we care about, is how much the individual spends on
consumption during the period in question.
These and other advantages that attach to a consumption tax
are undeniably considerable. By no means would all of the defini-
tional problems afflicting the income tax be solved-we still, for
example, would have to distinguish between personal and business
entertaining-but surely many would be, because it is chiefly the
difficulty of coping with capital income that has generated com-
plexity in present law. That difficulty largely disappears under a
consumption tax because the effect of allowing savings to be de-
ducted is to remove capital income from the tax base altogether.2"
The consumption tax is not without serious problems however.
One such problem is how to treat gifts and bequests. Suppose a
highly paid individual, having saved and invested a good part of
his income during his working years, and perhaps having seen
those investments appreciate, approaches the moment when his ac-
cumulated assets are to be handed down to his progeny. Should a
gift or a bequest at death be treated as a taxable consumption ex-
penditure by the donor or decedent as if giving were a form of con-
suming? Or should we treat the individual and his descendants as
a single, extended unit with no tax imposed until at long last some
spendthrift descendant decides to lavish the funds on consump-
tion? Consumption tax proponents apparently differ on this issue;
the more consistent view would be to tax nothing until, or unless,
accumulations were finally consumed by descendants. The point is
significant, at least conceptually. A decision not to tax gifts and
bequests to the donors or descendants highlights a major consump-
tion tax premise, namely, that wealth accumulations are not to be
taken into account in measuring an individual's ability to pay
taxes. Putting it differently, "ability to pay" in the conventional
24. See R. HALL & A. RABUSHKA, Low TAX, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAX (1983); Andrews, A
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1113 (1974).
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income tax sense is simply not a relevant criterion of taxability
under a consumption tax regime.
Those who support the consumption tax idea do so not because
they favor the rich and prosperous, but because they believe it is a
superior taxing system. Their reasons are twofold. The first is the
claim that it is better to tax people on what they withdraw from
the common pool through consumption rather than on what they
contribute or add to the common pool through saving.2 5 Consump-
tion generates pleasure and satisfaction; saving, by contrast, is an
act of sacrifice and self-denial, or at least postponement. Is it not
more appropriate, then, to treat consumption, rather than income,
as the measure of taxability? The second fairness claim is one of
neutrality. Under our income tax, it is argued, those who choose to
save-to defer consumption to later periods-are taxed twice,
while those who prefer to consume their income currently are
taxed only once. The point can be illustrated easily. Assume C
(consumer) and S (saver) each earn $1,000 and that the market
rate of interest is ten percent. In a tax-free world, C can spend
$1,000 on consumption this year while S, who prefers to defer con-
sumption, can spend $1,100 next year. The tradeoff between con-
sumption and saving is obviously $1.00 to $1.10. If a forty percent
income tax is enacted, C's current consumption is reduced to $600
because he has to pay a $400 tax. S, however, will be able to con-
sume only $636 in the second year because the income tax is im-
posed on both his current income of $1,000 and the $60 of interest
he earns on his savings. The after-tax tradeoff (i.e., $1.00 to $1.06)
is thus less than the pre-tax tradeoff. Under a consumption tax, by
contrast, S pays no tax in the current year and $440 ($1,100 x .40)
in the second, leaving him with $660 to spend in the later period.
The pre- and after-tax tradeoffs are the same (1.00 to 1.10) be-
cause "income" has been taxed only once. Arguably, then, consum-
ers and savers are treated alike under a consumption tax, while the
latter are penalized under an income tax.
While there is force to these arguments most Americans would
have difficulty recognizing the consumption tax as superior in fair-
ness and equity to a broad-based income tax. The reason for this is
that people do not regard saving as an act of self-denial where
high-income taxpayers are concerned, or as mere postponed con-
sumption. In our day at least, saving generally appears to take
25. See, e.g., Stiglitz, The Consumption-Expenditure Tax, in THE PROMISE OF TAX RE-
FORM 119 (J. Pechman ed. 1985).
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place only after all reasonable consumption preferences have been
fully satisfied, and hence sometimes appears to be the ultimate
luxury. It is hard to believe that a taxpayer who finds himself at
the year's end with residual income which he elects to invest in the
stock market should thereby effectively reduce his obligation to
pay taxes. This element would be redressed, and the two systems
would become quite alike if gifts and bequests were treated as tax-
able consumption. However, Congress is unlikely ever to be per-
suaded to include gifts and bequests in the consumption tax base.
In any event, inclusion is not consistent with the premise on which
the consumption tax idea is founded.
III. THE PRESIDENT'S FIRST TERM PROPOSALS
The foregoing more or less provides a picture of the tax policy
debate as it stood at the time President Reagan took office in 1981.
The economic buzzword at that moment in history was "stagfla-
tion," meaning very low or even negative growth in real terms to-
gether with a high rate of inflation. To deal with this condition,
Senator Roth26 and Representative Kemp,27 in 1978, proposed to
reduce individual income tax rates very sharply over a three-year
period.28 The principal effect, in their view and that of other be-
lievers in supply-side analysis, would be to increase materially the
level of total economic activity. Both Roth and Kemp believed that
existing marginal tax rates had greatly depressed incentives to
work, save, and invest, with this consequence being magnified by
an inflation which pushed taxpayers into higher tax brackets with-
out increasing their real incomes. If tax rates were reduced, work-
ers and savers would respond in a way that would lead to real
growth. This growth would be sufficient perhaps to make the tax
reduction self-financing, as well as to lessen inflation because of
the favorable effect on aggregate supply.2 9
Supporters of Kemp-Roth appeared to fall into two camps: first,
those who felt that tax reduction was good but would have to be
accompanied by some reductions in federal spending if further in-
flation or high interest rates were to be avoided; and second, those
who felt that tax reduction was very good and that, given the an-
26. Repub., Del.
27. Repub., N.Y.
28. H.R. 8333, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). For a discussion of the Kemp-Roth proposal,
see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE KEMP-ROTH TAX CUT PROPOSAL
(Oct. 1978).
29. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 28, at xiii.
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ticipated increase in the supply of labor and investment, corre-
sponding or even substantial cuts in federal spending were unnec-
essary.30 The latter group, of course, consisted of true believers, of
whom Representative Kemp was a leading advocate.
Most economists, on the other hand, were nonbelievers, appar-
ently convinced that labor response to changes in taxation was rel-
atively small, well below that needed for the proposed tax cuts to
be self-financing, and that the same was true with respect to rates
of personal saving. These mainstream economists argued that
large-scale tax reduction would quickly lead to high interest rates
and recession. The Kemp-Roth idea in its pure form (with no com-
mitment to spending constraints) was referred to by some of their
number as the "economics of joy," and this, it seems was the gen-
eral position of the profession.3 1
There was one economist who believed in the Kemp-Roth idea,
and it was his view that finally carried the day. The Economic Re-
covery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) was proposed by President Rea-
gan in February and passed in July with overwhelming congres-
sional support. Its principal features included:
(1) a three-year twenty-three percent cut in individual tax rates,
a reduction of the top tax bracket from seventy percent to fifty
percent, and the indexing of brackets as a means of reducing the
impact of inflation on the tax system;3 2
(2) a considerable list of special interest benefits for various
groups that traditionally line up at the revenue trough;33 and
(3) an enormous reduction in the taxes paid by corporations and
other businesses. This was achieved largely by adopting shortened
depreciation schedules for equipment and real estate, 34 and by in-
serting in the law a new procedure called safe-harbor leasing. This
30. Id. at x-xi.
31. For a discussion of the evidence concerning the effect of marginal tax rates on saving,
see Stein & Foss, Taxes and Savings, AEI ECONOMIST 6 (1981); THE SUPPLY-SIDE EFFECTS OF
ECONOMIC POLICY (L. Meyer ed. 1981).
32. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OP-
TIONS 238 (Feb. 1983) [hereinafter cited as REDUCING THE DEFICIT]. The Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) provided for reductions in the income tax rates as follows: 5% in
October 1981, 10% in July 1982, and 10% in July 1983. The cumulative rate reduction was
23% because of compounding. Id. Bracket indexation, as reflected in I.R.C. § 1(f) (1985),
was made applicable for 1985 and all subsequent taxable years.
33. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982)).
34. I.R.C. § 168(b) (1985).
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provision permits companies that cannot use their tax benefits to
transfer them, for a price, to companies that can."
From the standpoint of tax policy, ERTA reflected two major
ideas: hostility toward a progressive income tax and more broadly
toward the income tax as a whole, and a preference for the old but
newly risen idea of a tax on consumption. The antiprogressive ele-
ment of the 1981 legislation was naturally and necessarily present
in the concept of an across-the-board rate cut. A uniform percent-
age reduction in all rates necessarily resulted in a greater percent-
age difference between the after-tax income of a high-bracket and
a low-bracket taxpayer than was present before the reduction. In
effect, there was both an absolute rate reduction and a reduction of
the degree of progression in the rate schedule. Put simply, there
was a shift in the overall burden of the income tax from richer to
poorer together with lower taxes for all. It would be possible, even
easy, to reduce taxes without altering the after-tax relationships
among different classes of taxpayers. Hence it is proper to in-
fer-and it is consistent with the President's often-expressed dis-
like of progression-that the 1981 rate reduction had both aims in
view. In fact, the 1981 rate reduction meant little to lower-income
families, because there was no increase in personal exemptions or
the zero bracket amount, while for high-income families, the reduc-
tions were quite significant."
Movement in the direction of a consumption tax was assisted by
the adoption of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS). As
noted, the central element of a consumption tax is the deduction
from income of capital investment. Together with the Investment
Tax Credit (ITC), ACRS had precisely that effect, so that many
enormously profitable companies wound up owing no tax whatever,
and overall the tax on corporate enterprises declined precip-
itously. 7 The safe-harbor leasing device extended the benefits of
ITC and ACRS even to companies with modest capital investment
programs. Quite by accident, this also generated very handsome
fees for the lawyers and investment bankers who put the leasing
deals together.
The consequences of the 1981 tax legislation proved, within a
short time, to be most disappointing both in economic and political
35. Id. § 168(f)(8).
36. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REVISING THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 15 (July,
1983).
37. Id. Thus, the estimated effect of ERTA was to reduce corporate tax revenues from
$63 billion in 1979 to $37 billion in 1983. Id.
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terms. Recession, not growth, promptly ensued. Some critics of the
Reagan tax program took this as proof that supply-siders had
things upside down or at least wrong. Those critics argued that
lower tax rates do not spur workers to greater effort and that the
saving response to lower rates was far too small to make such rate
cuts self-financing.3 8 Other commentators took a more moderate
position: that the President had simply claimed too much for
ERTA and that in fact personal tax levels do not play an over-
whelmingly critical role in determining growth rates or the health
of the American economy in general.3 9
Political disenchantment arose for other reasons as well. First,
the very sharp reduction in corporate taxes resulting from the ac-
celerated depreciation provisions had an uneven impact on busi-
ness in general. Some major companies found their liabilities re-
duced to (or below) zero, while others were still saddled with
substantial tax obligations.40 Complaints were justifiably centered
on the nonneutrality of the new depreciation schedules. Beyond
this, the safe-harbor leasing provisions, which permitted tax de-
ductions and credits to be sold in the marketplace, appeared to
many to have a flavor of immorality about them, although they
merely served to allow unprofitable companies to participate along
with profitable ones in the general scheme of capital subsidies. Fi-
nally, and most acutely, the public as a whole became aware that
debt-financed tax shelters, the value of which had been substan-
tially enhanced by ERTA's depreciation rules, had become com-
mon practice among high-income taxpayers. The public realized
that tax shelters were operating not only to eliminate tax on in-
vestment income, but also to reduce or eliminate tax on personal
service income such as executive salaries and the earnings of top-
bracket professionals. The latter phenomenon, more than anything
else, is believed to have led to a public perception that the income
tax system had deteriorated to a new low of corruption and chaos.
How the President managed to escape blame and instead convert
it into a cause and battle cry ("swiss cheese") of his own is one of
the mysteries of our time.
Reaching beyond any of these considerations was the pervasive
sense, in 1982 as in 1986, that the federal budget deficit had
reached dangerous magnitudes and that steps must be taken at
38. REDUCING THE DEFICIT, supra note 30, at 16.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 3.
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once to increase revenues. The result of this concern, which grew
steadily in intensity, was the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 (TEFRA)."' It aimed at raising nearly $100 billion in
additional tax receipts over a three-year period. The guiding spirit
for TEFRA was not the President but Senator Dole, 2 and indeed
the President is reported to have hesitated for a time before throw-
ing his support behind it. The enactment of TEFRA in August
1982, was a great disappointment to supply-side supporters in and
out of the Treasury. Representative Kemp opposed it to the end."'
Although enacted in response to a perceived fiscal emergency,
TEFRA represented a significant if not conclusive retreat from
consumption tax philosophy. While individual rates were not in-
creased as some had proposed, the new enactment plainly reflected
a shift in focus from supply-side incentives to tax equity and base-
broadening." Corporate tax preferences were cut back, 5 provisions
in ERTA for the further acceleration of depreciation were re-
pealed41 (a major step made easier by the moderation of inflation),
ITC benefits were reduced,' 7 the safe-harbor leasing rules were
substantially altered and confined,'4 and new impetus was given to
enforcement and compliance, including withholding on interest
and dividends.' 9 To be sure, there were also excise tax increases,1°
and the withholding provision just mentioned was repealed before
it ever took effect.5 ' Yet, viewed overall, and in hindsight, the 1982
legislation may well have marked the end, or the beginning of the
end, of one aspect of the Reagan revolution. Of course, this is not
in reference to the movement toward rate reduction, for which the
President continues to demonstrate great enthusiasm. What may
have begun to reverse itself in TEFRA was the truly revolutionary
41. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982)), reprinted in 16 TAX NOTES
811, 836 (Aug. 30, 1982).
42. Repub., Kan.
43. P. ROBERTS, THE SUPPLY-SIDE REVOLUTION (1984).
44. See id.; Brown, President Wins on Tax Increase Gamble: A Loss for the Supply
Side-Business Coalition, 16 TAX NoTEs 798 (Aug. 23, 1982).
45. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 204(a), 96
Stat. 324, 423 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 291 (1982)).
46. Id. at 431.
47. Id. at 427, 429 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 48 (1982)).
48. Id. at 432-48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982)).
49. Id. at 576-79 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3451-56 (1982)).
50. Id. at 563-68 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C (1982)).
51. Pub. L. No. 98-67, § 102, 97 Stat. 369, 369-71 (1983).
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notion that consumption rather than income is the appropriate ba-
sis of our national tax system.
IV. THE PRESIDENT'S SECOND TERM PROPOSALS
If the latter assertion would have seemed premature or over bold
in 1982, by 1984 it could be made with greater confidence. In his
State of the Union Address in January 1984, the President di-
rected the Treasury to develop a tax reform plan which would
achieve fairness, simplicity, and incentives for economic growth.
5 2
What he got in November 1984, was a very lengthy proposal,
"Treasury I''15 which, together with substantial rate reduction,
contained a set of base-broadening measures that went farther in
the direction of academic purity than any practicing politician or
academic commentator would ever have dreamed possible. It is not
necessary to go through the proposal in detail, but, just to pick up
a few high points, Treasury I would have:
(1) repealed the capital gain preference completely, but allowed
the cost basis of investment property to be indexed for inflation;5 4
(2) repealed accelerated depreciation in favor of economic depre-
ciation, using true useful lives coupled with basis indexing;55
(3) repealed a wide variety of special interest provisions, includ-
ing those applicable to the oil business and the insurance and
banking industries;56
(4) substantially curtailed real estate tax shelters,57 disallowed
consumer interest deductions other than for principal home mort-
gages, 58 and materially decreased tax-free treatment for employee
fringe benefits;59 and finally,
(5) compressed the rate structure to only three brackets (four if
one includes the zero bracket) with the top rate being reduced
from fifty percent to thirty-five percent.60
52. State of the Union Address by President Reagan, reprinted in 130 CONG. REC. H143
(daily ed. Jan. 25, 1984).
53. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (3 vols., 1984).
54. 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 181 (1984).
55. Id. at 157.
56. Id. at 224-88.
57. Id. at 334-35.
58. Id. at 331-33.
59. Id. at 20-90.
60. Id. at 3.
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It would be interesting to know whether the President really
welcomed Treasury I or whether it took him by surprise. Although
well aware that the President desired to reduce rates, this author
believed that whatever happened President Reagan would never
seek to solve the tax system dilemma by proposing a radical base-
broadening measure. In any event, Treasury I implicitly rejected
the consumption tax concept and instead (and with a vengeance)
opted for the longstanding, but previously unattainable, ideal of
the comprehensive income tax base. Treasury I gave way to "Trea-
sury II'el in May 1985, and in the process lost some, though by no
means all, of its admirable reform features. The capital gain pref-
erence was restored for nondepreciable assets such as stocks and
bonds, but depreciable assets such as buildings and equipment
would still not qualify for the rate preference.62 The oil business, as
perhaps one might expect, recaptured some of the advantages it
would have lost under Treasury I, but other industries, including
insurance and banking, were not so fortunate. Individual tax shel-
ter opportunities, one of ERTA's outrages, continued to be cur-
tailed. Purists would obviously find more to criticize in Treasury II
than in Treasury I, but even they would have to concede that no
other administration had ever moved so swiftly and on so many
fronts toward achievement of the comprehensive tax base ideal.
Treasury II finally became a House Bill.63 With lobbyists work-
ing day and night in the corridors, the House gave up on a few
important items: depreciable property again would qualify for cap-
ital gain treatment,64 and tax shelter opportunities would not be
quite so sharply curtailed. 5 Yet in other respects the House Bill
accepts the proposals made in Treasury II and in some instances
strengthens them. It is hard to see how or why the President would
veto the Bill if passed intact. One can assume that his threat to do
so when the Bill was being debated in the House was merely a sop
to House Republicans and not seriously meant.
Viewed in overall terms, the House Bill in many respects
amounts to a repeal of ERTA. There is a further reduction of indi-
vidual rates, and the major compensating feature is the restoration
61. THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIM-
PLICITY (Prentice-Hall Inc. 1985).
62. Id. at 164.
63. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H12,579-830 (daily ed. Dec. 17,
1985).
64. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 186.
65. Id. at 292.
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of tax on capital income, particularly income from business invest-
ment. For the period 1986-1990, individual rate reductions as pro-
vided in the House Bill would cost the Treasury about $140 billion.
This would be financed by an increase in business taxes of about
$139 billion, plus minor increases in excise and estate taxes.66 The
idea of increasing business taxes through the medium of returning
to economic depreciation essentially represents a rejection of con-
sumption-based taxation, of which a major feature would have to
be the expensing of depreciable property. To be sure, even the
House Bill retains some consumption tax features, including the
capital gain preference; however, the main elements of the Bill in-
clude individual base-broadening provisions and a large-scale res-
toration of tax on business income, which are major trends in the
opposite direction.
Either the President moves in mysterious ways or this author
has no talent for psycho-history. Probably both are true. Once
again, there is nothing in Reagan's political background that would
have encouraged the expectation that he would lead the fight for
income tax reform; especially, at a moment when the income tax
itself appeared to be emitting its death rattle. Yet that is just what
has happened. Credit is certainly due and deserved to the House
Ways and Means Committee, of course, but chiefly to the Presi-
dent for having pressed on with the matter despite a relatively
tepid reaction from the public and outright opposition from some
sections of the business community.
Has the story reached its happy ending? No confident answer
can be given, unfortunately. Now that the Senate has passed its
own version of tax reform, with the support of the President, we
need only wait to see what the Conference Committee will do. The
expected opposition to the Bill never materialized in the Senate. If
one thinks, as this author does, that income rather than consump-
tion is the better measure of taxable capacity, then the final ver-
sion should be checked for consumption tax features. The place to
look is in the area of capital cost allowances (depreciation). If ac-
celerated depreciation and investment tax credits, together with
unlimited interest deductibility and reduced capital gain rates,
find their way back into the legislation, then it will be appropriate
to conclude that the promise of income tax reform has not been
kept.
66. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS FOR FiscAL YEARS
1986-1990, reprinted in 29 TAX NOTES 944 (Dec. 1985).
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V. CONCLUSION
There are two lessons to be learned about tax politics from ob-
serving the Reagan years to date. The first is that no one, not even
this most popular President, can avoid generating resentment and
public outcry if he attempts to move in the direction of a national
consumption tax. The idea of treating savings as exempt from tax
will seem to most voters to be class legislation. Whatever the logic
of economics, most people do not intuitively accept the notion that
investment constitutes an act of self-deprivation that deserves to
be rewarded with a tax exemption. It is the command of resources
to which people attach value and which appears to be the appro-
priate measure of ability to pay. Tax policy analysts would spend
their time more fruitfully by working to improve the income tax
than by continuing to promote the consumption tax as a substitute
structure.
The second and equally important lesson may turn out to be
that the American people actually favor the concept of progression
and would view a flat-rate tax as inequitable. The President's rate
reduction plan, which is perfectly consistent with his oft-stated
dislike of the progressive rate schedule, was more advantageous for
high income individuals than the House Bill. Under the Presi-
dent's proposals, the distribution of the individual tax cut was di-
vided almost equally between individuals earning more than
$75,000 and individuals earning less than that amount, although of
course the great bulk of Americans fall in the under-$75,000 class.
The House Bill divides the tax cut roughly one-quarter to the
"overs" and three-quarters to the "unders" by altering the bracket
levels and raising the top bracket rate from thirty-five percent to
thirty-eight percent.0 7 An admittedly unprovable and self-serving
hunch is that the rather spiritless public reaction to the Presi-
dent's tax proposals, despite the promise of lower rates, is tracea-
ble to this very factor. As noted, the President stumped the coun-
try for tax reform during the Spring of 1985, and the White House
report of his grass-roots speech notes that applause was received
from his listeners at many points. When, however, speaking at a
rally in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, he triumphantly declared that under
his plan nobody earning over $70,000 a year would have to pay
more than thirty-five percent in tax, there appears to have been
67. Id. at 945.
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dead silence. 8 Very few of those present were anywhere near that
level of income or ever expected to be.
Once again, people react with considerable skepticism to the im-
age of the courageous entrepreneur-that hard-working risktaker
who is finally rewarded with wealth and blessedness, and who is so
much a part of the President's political ideal. People like that im-
age, but in the end rather doubt that the market operates at all
times and in all circumstances as a just and accurate allocator of
rewards and blessings. The very mild egalitarian counterforce that
is contained in the idea of a progressive income tax may well seem
logical to many Americans, rich and poor alike, on quiet reflection.
As of 1985, the gap between federal spending and federal reve-
nues was running more than five percent of gross national prod-
uct.6 9 Most economists seem to believe that the gap has to be nar-
rowed in the near future, but it is doubtful that anyone really
believes this can be done by cutting spending alone. Quite possibly,
even probably, additional revenues will have to be found. The
President has shown us where these revenues might come from,
namely, the elimination of tax preferences. Reducing the capital
gains exclusion to its historic level of fifty percent, for example,
would add nearly $14 billion to revenues over the next five years.
Limiting the deduction for consumer interest to, for example,
$10,000, would add nearly $20 billion over the same period. 70 All of
this, of course, without increasing rates, but with a substantial in-
crease in the equity and fairness of the tax system.
Authority for this position, to be sure, could be found in the Bi-
ble. Improving the income tax offers the best hope of restoring in-
tegrity to our tax system, and some hope of coping with our fiscal
difficulties. Feeling this way about the matter, I can do no better,
in the end, than to echo the Great Communicator and urge that
we, "Go for it."
68. See Oshkosh Speech, supra note 4, at 2.
69. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK. FISCAL YEARS
1986-1990 PART I XIV (Feb. 1985).
70. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OP-
TIONS PART II 276, 291 (Feb. 1985).
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